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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
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Plaintiff/Respondent,
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:

MIKEL SHANE MILLER,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

Case No. 920255
910071-CA

:

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court and the court of appeals properly
hold that "the totality of the circumstances•' test applies to the
question of whether a confession was voluntarily given, and
correctly rule that Petitioner's confession was admissible
against him under that test?
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
AND
ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR GRANT OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The court of appeals opinion, State v, Miller, appears
at 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, copied in the Appendix to this brief;
the decision was entered on March 24, 1992. The State stipulated
to a thirty-day extension of time in which to file the petition
for certiorari, which was filed May 28, 1992.
Petitioner argues that the court of appeals decision in
the case at bar is in conflict with another decision of the court
of appeals, permitting certiorari review under Rule 46(a), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State accepts the statement of the case and the
fact statement set forth in the court of appeals opinion, 183
Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (1992).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER HAS NOT SHOWN A CONFLICT BETWEEN
DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
Petitioner has not shown good reason to review the
court of appeals decision here.

"Review by a writ of certiorari

is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be
granted only for special and important reasons."
46.

Utah R. App. P.

Contrary to his argument for certiorari, petitioner fails to

show that this case conflicts with another decision of the court
of appeals.

See Utah R. App. P. 46 (b).

Affirming the admissiblity of petitioner's confession,
the court of appeals followed this Court's holding in State v.
Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989), that "the determination of
voluntariness of confessions requires the court to consider 'the
totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.'"

JLd. at 225 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

412 U.S. 218f 226 (1973)).

Petitioner claims that the court of

appeals decision in State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App.
1991), conflicts with the court of appeals decision here,
claiming that the Singer panel did not consider the defendant's
"peculiar characteristics" in judging whether that confession was
2

voluntary.

Therefore, he argues, the courts here should not have

considered his personal characteristics when determining that his
confession was voluntary.
In order for a confession to be involuntary, there must
be "police overreaching," or coercive misconduct.
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986).
police misconduct.

See Colorado

In Singer, there was no

In fact, defendant Singer admitted that his

conversation with police was not inherently coercive; instead, he
argued that his statements were involuntary due to his peculiar
characteristics.

Singer, 815 P.2d at 1309.

Singer claimed that

he was susceptible to "subtle coercion" when the officers spoke
of their desire to return home after a long seige.

However, the

court rejected Singer's claim that the officers' remarks were
equivalent to interrogation, holding that they were nothing more
than "the natural expression of familial sentiment", and not an
attempt to manipulate the defendant into talking.

Singer, 815

P.2d at 1312.
Accordingly, while there was some degree of coercion in
this case—i.e., questioning in jail, mention of federal charges,
183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41—none was present in Singer.
Defendant's statements in Singer "were not the product of
coercive tactics . . . [but] were voluntarily made."
P.2d at 1311.

Singer, 815

Thus, the defendant's alleged peculiarities in

Singer were irrelevant because there was no police coercion.
Because this case did involve some coercive police
conduct, it became necessary to examine petitioner's personal

3

characteristics.

The trial court and the court of appeals ruled

that those characteristics—intelligence, articulateness,
experience with the criminal system, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4 1 —
protected petitioner's will from being overborne by that police
conduct.

Therefore, both courts concluded that his confession

was voluntary.
Petitioner misreads the court's evaluation of the
accused's characteristics in Singer.

Singer provided expert

testimony to support his claim that he "was uniquely susceptible
to subtle coercion and . . . extremely gullible."
P.2d at 1310.

Singer, 815

However, much of this testimony was "effectively

discredited by the State's own expert."

Ld.

Thus, although the

absence of police coercion made it unnecessary to consider
Singer's personal characteristics in determining whether his
statements had been voluntary, the court did so, and actually
rejected his "gullibility" claim on its merits.
In sum, Singer does not conflict with Petitioner's
case.

Because defendant Singer had not been subjected to any

coercive police conduct, no detailed examination of his personal
characteristics was needed.

Here, examination of Petitioner's

personal characteristics under this Court's guiding precedent in
Strain supported the trial court and the court of appeals in
their conclusion that, despite some coercive police conduct,
petitioner's confession was voluntary.

4

POINT II
PETITIONER DID NOT PROPERLY PRESERVE HIS
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE FOR APPEAL IN THE
TRIAL COURT.
Petitioner claims that his state constitutional issue
was properly preserved in the trial court by merely having a cite
to State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943)f a case containing
some state constitutional analysis, in his motion to suppress.
Petitioner also cites State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah
1987), asserting that "[a] proper objection need not cite a case;
it need only fairly apprise the trial judge of the essence of the
objection." Id. at 1076.

However, in this case, the trial judge

never was "apprised" of petitioner's state constitutional
argument, since it was not argued before the judge.
Furthermore, Crank itself does not even advocate a
different analysis between the state and federal constitutions.
Crank quotes from Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct.
183 (1897), in reaching its determination.
P.2d at 188-89.

See, e.g., Crank, 142

Consequently, since Crank relied on Bram in its

conclusions, it was implicitly rejected in Strain, when this
Court noted and endorsed the rejection of Bram's "rigid rule"
that "any threat or promise, however slight, renders a confession
involuntary and inadmissible . . .•"

779 P.2d at 227.

Therefore, the court of appeals correctly held here
that petitioner's state constitutional issue was not properly
preserved because it "was not argued before the trial court, nor
brought to the court's attention for consideration."

5

183 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 42 (1992).

Petitioner should not be allowed to make

an end-run around the rule that, absent exceptional
circumstances,

an issue "not presented to the trial court . . .

has not been properly preserved for appeal", State v. Anderson,
789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990), by merely citing a questionable case
in a motion to suppress, without analysis.
POINT III
THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST IS THE
PROPER TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CONFESSION
IS VOLUNTARY.
The State believes that a detailed response to
petitioner's argument for a "Rram-like" approach to confessions
is not necessary at this point.

He did not adequately preserve

his argument for such an approach in the trial court.

This Court

rejected that approach in Strain, which was followed here.

Nor

has this Court expressed any dissatisfaction with the federallyoriginated "totality of the circumstances" approach.

Compare

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 466-69 (Utah 1990) (plurality
opinion) (decrying federal law of automobile searches as a
contradictory "labyrinth," and espousing new approach under Utah
Constitution).

Accordingly, his argument for a departure from

the federal model can be dismissed with minimal consideration.

6

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Writ of
Certiorari should be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j5~2r-day of July, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

i• ^yw,i

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari were mailed, postage prepaid, to RONALD S. FUJINO and
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR., attorneys for defendant/petitioner, 424
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

O^day

of

July, 1992.
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ATTORNEYS:
Charles F. Loyd, Jr. and Ronald S. Fujino,
Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and
Russon.
This opinion is subject torevisionbefore
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
GARFF, Judge:
Mikel Shane Miller appeals his conviction of
third degree burglary and third degree theft,
claiming the trial judge improperly admitted
into evidence a coerced and involuntary confession. We affirm.

U3UtakA*.Ht».40
IN THI£
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff nnd Appellee,
v.
Mikel Shape MILLER,
Defendant aid Appellant,
No.tlM71«CA
FILED: March 14,

tm

Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Scott Daniels

UTAH

FACTS
Miller was booked into the Salt Lake
County Jail on July 2 or 3, 1990, following a
parole violation unrelated to the charges involved in this appeal. On July 6, 1990, a detective interrogated Miller about his possible
involvement in a burglary and theft of a
computer store.
Prior to the interrogation, the detective
informed Miller of the potential charges facing
him and read Miller his Miranda rights. The
detective promised Miller that he would make
the best recommendation possible to the prosecutor and would attempt to 'get [the
charges] filed as kr* as he possibly could" if
Miller cooperated. Xkt detective also informed
Miller that he potentially faced federal charges
and resulting penalties. Miller then confessed
to the crimes and was released from jail into
the custody of the detective in order to help
recover the stolen goods.
Miller cooperated extensively with the detective in recovering the stolen goods. He also
cooperated with other officers in a later, successful sting operation. Felony charges were,
however, eventually filed against Miller.
At trial, the State sought admission of the
confettfon. Miller objected, claiming the detective had not met his part of the bargain in
getting the charges reduced to misdemeanors.
Miller argued that promises of leniency and
threau of federal charges coercively induced
his confession.
The court applied a 'totality of circumstances' test in deciding whether to admit the
testimony. It found the length of time Miller
had vent in Jail prior to the interrogation and
the threau of possible federal charges were
'impermissibly coercive.* However, the court,
noting Miller's familiarity with the justice
system and various interrogation techniques,
also found him to be intelligent, well-spoken
and articulate. Thus, based on the totality of
the circumstances, the court declared Miller's
confession voluntary and denied his motion to
suppress.

aurora
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Following a bench trial, Miller was convicted of two third degree felonies, burglary and
theft. The trial judge commented that without
Miller's confession, he could not have found
Miller guilty on the theft charge.
Miller appeals, claiming the confession was
improperly admitted into evidence because it
was obtained through promises of leniency
and threats of federal prosecution in a coercive environment. Miller also claims that the
Fifth Amendment of the Utah Constitution
provides broader protection against self incrimination than does the totality of the circumstances test of the federal constitution.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The 'ultimate issue of 'voluntariness' (of a
confession] is a legal question/ Arizona v.
Fulminante, _ U . S _ 111 S. Q 1246, 1252
(1991) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.
104,110,106 S. Q. 445,449-50 (1985)); accord,
State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1309
(Utah App. 1991), which we review independently giving no deference to the trial court.
Suite v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah
1991). 'It is the duty of an appellate court ...
'to examine the entire record ard make an
independent determination of the ultimate
issue of voluntariness." State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 464 n.76 (Ufeh 1W) (quoting
Beckwith v. United States, 425 US. 341, 348,
96 S. Q . 1612,1617(1976)).
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
Miller claims promises of leniency and
threats of federal prosecution in a coercive
environment induced his involuntary confession.
Miller's claim is based largely on the trial
court's determination that the threat of
federal charges, the promises of leniency and
the length of his stay in jail prior to the interrogation were evidence of 'impermissible" I
coercion.1 Certainly, there are cases which I
support such a conclusion. Threats of possibly 1
greater charges were found to be coercive in
State v. Rhiner, 352 N.W.2d 258, 262-64
(Iowa 1984) (defendant coercively tol4 'he
might be in Jeopardy on other charges unless
he cooperated"). Promises of leniency have
also been found to be a coercive factor. United
StMtes v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335
9th Or. 1981) ("promise to aeek lenient tre- I
atment" is evidence of coercion). Moreover, I
confinement in jail provides a suspect letting I
for coercive interrogations. StMte v. Moore, I
697 ?JU 233,236 (Utah 1985).
However, in StMte v. Strain, 779 PJd 221
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court declined
to follow a strict per ae rule and designated
the totality of circumstances test as appropriate for determining the voluntariness of a
confession.1 Id. at 227. The court stated,
*(w)hile is Aram v. United StMtes, 168 U.S.
532, 18 S. O . 183, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897), the

statement was made that any threat or
promise, however slight, renders a confession
involuntary and inadmissible, later cases do
not repeat that rigid rule but follow the totality of all the circumstances test/ Strain, 779
P.2d at 227. The court then remanded Strain
to the trial court to determine the voluntariness of the confession by considering the
'totality of all the surrounding circumstances/ Id. Therefore, we continue our analysis
to determine whether from the totality of the
circumstances 'the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation"
support the trial court's conclusion that the
confession was voluntary. Id. at 225 (quoting
Schneckioth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
226,93 S. Q. 2041,2047 (1973)).
The record reveals that defendant is an
intelligent individual with some college education. The trial court noted that Miller "has a
mind that can make sudden and important
distinctions in language/ He is also very
familiar with the legal system. He has been to
prison twice, jailed four times, and has had
some fifteen encounters with police. Miller's
own recollection of the interrogation demonstrates he was familiar with interrogation techniques and that he actively and intelligently
participated in the interrogation:
I told [the detective] 1 was aware
where I am at that time frame with
the system, unfortunately, and that
I've seen the you scratch my back,
I'll scratch yours type of play
before, and I don't want to put my
neck on the line and go through all
this for nothing, to incriminate
myself.... [I]f there is any way
possible that I can work my way
out of a felony, I would be more
than willing to do that.
In short, the record reveals Miller actively
participated in the interrogation process, and
may have actually initiated and sobcited the
promise to recommend more lenient treatment,
and that he was fully aware of the possible
effect of a confession. In addition, the detective did not unqualifiedly promise Miller he
would not be charged with a felony, but only
that be would use his best efforts to have the
charge reduced.
The trial judge thus correctly refused to
suppress Miller's confession under the totality
of the circumstances test because "the characteristics of the accused* outweigh any potentially coercive "details of the interrogation/
Id.
STATE CONSTITUTION
Miller argues that the Utah Constitution
provides broader protection against the admission of involuntary confessions than does the
federally adopted "totality of the circumstances" test. We need not reach this issue as it

UTAH ADVANCE EEPORTS

—

,

183 UUh > v. Rep. 40

was not presented to the trial court at the
suppression hearing, and thereby has not been
properly preserved for appeal. State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990). Also,
Miller has failed to present any exceptional
circumstances or demonstrate plain error,
either of which would warrant an exception to
this rule. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 78
(Utah App. 1990).
Rather, Miller argues that this issue was
properly preserved for appeal on the ground
that he cited the case of State v. Crank, 105
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943) in his Memorandum Supporting Defendant's Motion to
Suppress.* However, the argument that Crank
may be read to provide broader protections in
suppression hearings was not argued before
the trial court, nor brought to the court's
attention for consideration. We refuse to
adopt such a broad rule that would preserve
an issue for appeal by merely citing to a case
without accompanying argument. Barring
exceptional circumstances or plain error, a
party must bring an issue to the attention of
the trial court to properly preserve it for
appeal.
CONCLUSION
In light of the totality of the circumstances,
the trial court did not err in concluding that
the confession was voluntary. Therefore, the
trial court did not err in refusing to suppress
Miller's confession.
Affirmed.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge
1. The trial judge stated:
There is no doubt in my mind there was
some indication of leniency given to the
defendant here....
I think that what the officer told Mr.
Miller in jail was ... "listen, 2 am close
to the prosecutor. He generally will
accept my recommendations. If you can
help us we will see what you can
produce and I will do the best 1 can to
get him to file misdemeanor charges."
I assume (the officer] also told
(Miller] he was facing federal charges
and that that was in some way a coercion.... 1 find that he had been in jail
three or four days, which is a substantial
time, and that indicates to some extent
there is some coercion.
2. The United States Supreme Court likewise recently declined to follow a strict per se rule in Arizona
v. Fulminante, _ J J . S _ 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252
0991).
3. In Crank, the Utah Supreme Court relied on
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution to
determine whether a confession was admissible, but
the court did not address the issue of whether state
UTAH AOVAN
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constitutional protections might be broader than
federal protections.

